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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
         
No. 01-2485
         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL EDWARD CHARLES,
Appellant
         
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. Criminal No. 00-cr-00377)
District Judge:  Hon. Thomas K. Moore
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 17, 2004
Before:  SLOVITER, FUENTES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  December 22, 2004)
         
OPINION OF THE COURT
         
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Michael Edward Charles was convicted of burglary and armed robbery
in the District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John.  On
     1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the criminal trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3231
and 48 U.S.C. § 1612; this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 48 U.S.C.
§ 1613 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
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appeal, he challenges several evidentiary rulings of the District Court.1  For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
I.
 The prosecution’s evidence at trial showed that on February 15, 1998, two men
burglarized a rental villa in Estate Peterborg, St. Thomas, and robbed its occupants while
one held a sawed-off shotgun.  Latent fingerprints were lifted from areas in the bathroom
which was the entry point and from a drinking glass, which was handled by one of the
perpetrators.
In August 1998, Charles, an illegal alien and police informant, became a suspect in
the armed robbery.  On July 12, 1999, four Virgin Islands police officers followed
Charles to his apartment complex, detained him, and brought him to a police station to be
fingerprinted.  Charles’ fingerprints matched the latent prints gathered from the crime
scene.
On June 27, 2000, Charles was lured to the Virgin Islands Safe Streets Task Force
(VISSTF) office under the pretense of receiving a work permit, and was placed under
arrest.  Warrington Tyson, a Virgin Islands police officer assigned to the VISSTF,
testified that he read Charles his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and then presented him with an advice of rights form.  Charles refused to sign the
3form, stating he was unable to read.  Accordingly, Officer Tyson noted on the form,
“[u]nable to read and refuse [sic] to sign.  However, the rights was read to the
Defendant.”  Supp. App. at 188.  Officer Tyson testified that Charles answered “yes”
when asked if he was willing to give a statement.  He then confessed to his participation
in the February 15, 1998 burglary.  At no time during the interview did Charles attempt to
stop the questioning, ask for an attorney, or state that he did not understand any of the
questions.
On July 27, 2000, the grand jury returned a five-count indictment charging Charles
in count I with unlawful possession of a firearm by an alien, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(5) and 924(a)(2); in count II with unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of
14 V.I. Code § 2253(a); in count III with burglary in the first degree and aiding and
abetting, in violation of 14 V.I. Code §§ 442(1) and 11; in count IV with robbery in the
first degree and aiding and abetting, in violation of 14 V.I. Code §§ 1862(2) and 11; and
in count V with grand larceny and aiding and abetting, in violation of 14 V.I. Code §§
1083(1) and 11.
On December 7, 2000 Charles filed a motion to suppress his June 27, 2000
confession.  He claimed that his statements were obtained without properly advising him
of his Miranda rights and without obtaining proper waiver.  The District Court denied the
suppression motion.
Charles’ trial commenced on December 11, 2000 and concluded on December 12,
42000, when the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.  On June 4, 2001 the
District Court sentenced Charles to 87 months imprisonment on count I; five years
imprisonment on the territorial charges in counts II and V; and ten years imprisonment on
the territorial charges in counts III and IV.  The sentence on count I was to be served
concurrently with the sentences on counts II, III, IV and V.  The sentences imposed on
counts II and III were to be served consecutively with each other and concurrently with
the sentences on counts IV and V.  A supervised release term of three years was imposed
and the District Court ordered Charles to pay restitution of $ 2,764.
Charles filed a timely notice of appeal, and the District Court appointed appellate
counsel.  By motion and supporting memorandum of law dated December 18, 2002,
appointed appellate counsel moved to withdraw from representation pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  On or about June 20, 2003, Charles served and filed a
brief pro se.  The Government filed a brief responding to the Anders brief and to Charles’
pro se brief.  On March 11, 2004, this Court declined to accept the Anders brief,
discharged appellate counsel and directed the clerk to appoint new counsel for Charles.
On appeal, Charles raises three issues.  He claims:
A.
The district court committed plain error when at trial it
admitted into evidence the July 12, 1999 fingerprints that the
Virgin Islands Police Department/FBI Virgin Islands Safe
Streets Task Force took of Mr. Charles, in their office, as a
result of an unlawful detention, in violation of his Fourth
Amendment Rights to freedom of movement.
5. . .
B.
The district court committed clear error in denying Mr.
Charles’ Motion to suppress his June 27, 2000 alleged
confession when it reasoned that if rights were read to Mr.
Charles when he was brought to the INS on July 15, 1999,
then it’s assumed that his rights were read to him at his arrest
on June 27, 2000 by the officers of the Virgin Islands Police
Department/Virgin Islands Safe Streets Task Force.
. . .
C.
The district court abused its discretion when it limited Mr.
Charles’ Sixth Amendment right to cross examine INS Agent
Nash to impeach Special Agent Warrington O. Tyson for bias.
Appellant’s Br. at i-ii.
II.
A.  The Fingerprint Evidence
 For the first time on appeal, Charles claims that because the police acted without
probable cause or proper judicial authorization, his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by his July 12, 1999 detention and the attendant seizure of his fingerprint
impressions.  Accordingly, he asserts that the District Court committed plain error by
admitting the July 12, 1999 fingerprint card at trial.
Rule 12(b)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that motions
to suppress evidence be made before trial.  See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d
6992, 1006 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that objection to manner in which search warrant was
issued and executed was waived where not raised in suppression motion); United States v.
Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1057 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1048
(1994) (same).  Parties who fail to raise such motions before the deadline established by
the district court waive the right to challenge the admission of such evidence. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 12(e).  The court may, however, grant relief from waiver if the party who missed
the deadline shows good cause.  Id.
In the instant case, Charles has not attempted to show good cause for his failure to
submit a timely motion.  His claim has accordingly been waived.
B.  Charles’ Confession
Charles next contends that the District Court erred by denying his motion to
suppress his confession, which was allegedly obtained by the police who failed to advise
him of his Miranda rights.  “This Court reviews the District Court's denial of a motion to
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and exercises plenary review
of the District Court's application of the law to those facts.”  United States v. Perez, 280
F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).
During the suppression hearing, the District Court weighed the conflicting factual
recitations of Officer Tyson, who testified that he read Charles his rights, and Charles,
who denied that he was informed of his rights.  The District Court concluded that Charles
had been read his Miranda rights, and furthermore that he made a knowing, willing and
7voluntary waiver of those rights.  “It is the law of this Circuit, as well as many others, that
a fact-finder's determination of credibility is not subject to appellate review.”  Gov’t of
the V.I. v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir. 1974).  Accordingly, we uphold the
credibility determination of the District Court, and its decision to deny the motion to
suppress.  See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 507 F.2d 197, 198 (3d Cir. 1975).
C.  Right to Confrontation
Prior to Charles’ arrest, Officer Tyson and Charles had an agent-informant
relationship; Officer Tyson described Charles as someone that could provide “information
with respect to some criminal activity that was happening on the street.”  Supp. App. at
74.  Charles contends that at some point, prior to his arrest, this relationship “sour[ed].” 
Supp. App. at 86.
During cross examination of Immigration and Naturalization Special Agent Joan
Nash, called by the prosecution for the sole purpose of establishing the element of
Charles’ alienage, Charles attempted to illicit testimony of this failed relationship in order
to impeach Officer Tyson’s earlier testimony for bias.  The District Court sustained the
government’s objection to this line of questioning, finding it irrelevant.  Charles now
contends that his inability to cross examine Ms. Nash with regards to Officer Tyson’s
inherent bias violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, the Supreme Court established that the exposure of a
“witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the
     2 The following exchange occurred during Charles’ cross examination of Officer
Tyson:
Defense: In fact, you had more than one contact with Mr. Charles before
June 27th of 2000?
Tyson: Yes, I did.
Defense: And isn’t it correct that in those contacts you attempted to gain his
help in your line of work; isn’t that correct?
Tyson: Yes, I did.
Defense: And you were unhappy with the help that he had given you; isn’t
that correct?
Tyson: No.
Defense: You were not unhappy?
Tyson: No.
Defense: You did not find his help useful; isn’t that correct?
Tyson: That is correct.
Supp. App. at 71-72.
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constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”  475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986)
(internal quotations omitted).  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment,
however does not prevent a trial judge from imposing a limit on defense counsel’s inquiry
into the potential bias of a prosecution witness.  Id. at 679.  This court has held that
“whether a trial court has abused its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of a
witness for bias depends on whether the jury had sufficient other information before it,
without the excluded evidence, to make a discriminating appraisal of the possible biases
and motivation of the witness[].”  United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir.
2003) (internal quotations omitted).
In the present case, Charles was given ample opportunity to explore this alleged
bias during cross examination of Officer Tyson.2  Thus, Charles exercised his right to
confrontation in a meaningful manner, and the jury had ample information before it,
without the cross examination of Ms. Nash, to discern any latent motivations present in
Officer Tyson’s testimony.  Accordingly, we hold that Charles’ Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation was not violated.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence.
